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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA
GLEN W. ROLLINS, RUTH ELLEN
ROLLINS, NANCY LOUISE ROLLINS,
and O. WAYNE ROLLINS
II, as trustees of The 1993 Gary W. Rollins
Marital Trust,

)
)
)
)

) Civil Action No.: 2014CV249480
)
)

Plaintiffs.

)
)

v.

)
)
)
)
)
)

LOR, INC., GARY W. ROLLINS and
R. RANDALL ROLLINS,
Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMiVIARY JUDG~IENT
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to All Claims.
Having considered the Motion and the briefs and evidence submitted by the parties, the Court

I. Facts

A. LOR Formation, Ownership, and Management
In 1978, O. Wayne Rollins founded Defendant LOR, Inc. ("LOR") as a vehicle. to

manage the Rollins family wealth. I In 1986, the elder Wayne2 elected for LOR to be taxed as a
closely held corporation pursuant to Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code so the
corporation would not be subject to federal income tax at the corporate level and the taxes would

I Until 2003, LOR provided a variety of administrative, financial, and other services for members of the Rollins
family. Since 2003, these functions are handled by REA Management Company, LLC ("REA"). RFA's manager is
LOR and its members include the Gary and Randall's voting trusts and nine other Rollins family trusts.
2 As this is a family matter, first names will be used throughout this Order for the sake of brevity and clarity.
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instead pass through to shareholders.

At the time of this S-corporation election, he also created

nine Qualified S-trusts to hold stock in LOR for each of his grandchildren. The assets of each STrust are to be distributed to the beneficiary when he or she turns 45 years old. The elder Wayne
owned the majority of the voting stock (Class B stock) and his sons, Defendants Gary and
Randall Rollins, owned minority voting stock (Class C stock). Class A non-voting stock was
owned by the elder Wayne (17.4%), Gary and Randall (18.3% each), and the S-Trusts
collectively.

The elder Wayne died in 1991 and his Class B stock converted to non-voting stock

and passed to Gary and Randall.
In 1993, Gary and Randall, in consultation with advisors at Arthur Anderson and King &
Spalding and LOR senior employee Glenn Grove, initiated the Rollins Family Capital
Preservation Plan (the "Plan"), a series of estate planning transactions designed to pass their
LOR shares to their children and grandchildren without subjecting them to estate, gift, or transfer
taxes and yet maintain control of LOR. Gary and Randall each transferred a lifetime income
interest in their LOR Class A non-voting shares (56,507 shares each) to The 1993 Gary W.
Rollins Marital Trust (the "Marital Trust") and The 1993 Randall Rollins Marital Trust (the
"Randall Marital Trust"). Plaintiffs, the children of Gary and Ruthie Rollins, are the trustees of
the Marital Trust. Upon the death of Ruthie, the remainder income interest was to pass to the
Rollins Children'S Trusts (including trusts in each of the Plaintiffs' names) in exchange for an
established sum and ultimately the Grandchildren's Trust would have an option to buy half the
interest from the Children's Trusts in 2024.
The Marital Trust was established as a grantor trust. See 26 U.S.C. 361(c)(2)(A)(i). Gary
was the grantor and is liable for taxes on grantor trust's income. Neither the Marital Trust nor
Ruthie as beneficiary had any tax liability. Under the Marital Trust Agreement, Gary retained

2

the right as grantor to swap the property held in trust for property of equivalent value and all
income was to be distributed to Ruthie.
The Plan was introduced to Plaintiffs by Gary and Grove at a family meeting in
December, 1993, but the planned transactions were not discussed in detail. Plaintiffs aver they
were told at that meeting Gary would be trustee of the Marital Trust until his death at which time
Plaintiffs would be trustees, a fact Defendants dispute. Gary and Plaintiffs signed paperwork
implementing the Plan on December 20, 1993, and again on January 7, 1994, executing the
Marital Trust agreement and a first and second Agreement Concerning Simultaneous Gift and
Remainder Sale in their capacity as trustees and Promissory Notes for certain sums as
consideration for the remainder interest flowing to the Children's Trusts in their capacity as
grantors and trustees. Plaintiffs aver they were only given signature pages and were not given
copies of the 1993 Transaction Documents to review or keep. On February 19, 1994 Plaintiffs
signed a Master Custody Agreement establishing a custodial account for the Marital Trust at
Northern Trust." LOR and then RF A acted as administrator of the Marital Trust on behalf of the
trustees until early 2011.

Grove was primarily responsible for the administration of the Marital

Trust but testified he never consulted Plaintiffs regarding decisions made on behalf of the Marital
Trust.
On Apri115,

1996, LOR's articles of incorporation were amended to clarify that the Class

C stock held its voting rights even if maintained in a voting trust.
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All the shareholders signed

the unanimous consent approving the amendment, including all four Plaintiffs in their capacities

) On October 29, 2008, Glen signed an updated Master Custody Agreement allowing RFA to manage the Northern
Trust custodial account.
4 Gary and Randall had transferred their LOR Class C shares to revocable voting trusts in 1994. In this same year,
Grace bought the LOR Class B shares out of a QTIP account that held the shares since the death of the elder Wayne
and sold it ro Peggy and Ruthie, the wives of Randall and Gary, respectively, who in tum sold the Class B shares to
their husbands.
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as trustees of the Marital Trust. On November 8, 1999, the LOR shareholders signed an
agreement that no shares would be transferred outside the Rollins family. Three of the four
Plaintiffs signed the shareholder agreement in their capacities as trustees of the Marital TrustWayne II did not sign. Glen, Ellen, and Nancy were only provided the signature pages and have
testified they did not understand themselves to be trustees of the Marital Trust when they signed.
Each year, either Glen or Ellen would sign tax returns filed on behalf of the Marital Trust.
Plaintiffs aver they never had the opportunity to review the Marital Trust instrument in detail and
were not aware they were the trustees of the Marital Trust until December, 2010, when Carson
notified them of their status as trustees via emaiL The Rollins Family Office administered the
Marital Trust and made all decisions regarding the use and distribution of the Marital Trust
income without consulting or informing Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have testified they had trusted their father, uncle, and the "Rollins Family
Office," i.e. LOR and then RFA, to handle their financial business and wealth management, and
believed they were all working in the Plaintiffs' best interest. Until August 10,2010, Plaintiffs
received only very bigh level information about the family business at family meetings. The
Rollins Family Office would typically provide Plaintiffs signature pages of agreements or tax
documents to sign without the full documentation.
Currently, the LOR Class A non-voting shares are owned by Gary and Randall (17.4%
combined), the two Marital Trusts (1'8.3% each), and the S-Trusts (or the beneficiaries of the STrust for those who have reached 45 and accepted the shares). As relates to this lawsuit, the sole
asset of the Marital Trust is 56,507 non-voting shares of LOR. LOR's Board of Directors ("LOR
Board") and officers since LOR's inception are as follows:
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1986-1991
Randall;
Gary;
Wayne (pres)

1991-2003

2003-2015

Randall (Pres);
Gary (VP);
Joe Young
(Sec/Treas)

Randall (pres);
Gary (VP);
Donald Carson

Feb. 17,2015M-ar 22, 2016
Randal1 (Pres);
Gary (VP);
Donald Carson;
Pamela Rollins;
Timothy Rollins;
Amy Rollins
Kreisler

Mar. 23, 2016-

nresent
Randall (pres);
Gary (VP);
Donald Carson;
Pamela Rollins;
Timothy Rollins;
Amy Rollins Kreisler;
Paul Morton;
Thomas Claiborne

Gary and Randall, as LOR's controlling shareholders, may remove directors with or without
cause at any time.

B. LOR's Investments
On December 16,2002, the LOR Board voted to invest LOR's stock in three different
Rollins public companies (Rollins, Inc., RPC, Inc., and Marine Products Corporation ("MPC"»
(the "Rollins Public Company stock") into three new investment partnerships: RFPS Investments
I, L.P., RFPS Investments Il, L.P., and RFPS Investments III, L.P., (collectively, the "REPS
Investments Partnerships'tj'

These entities were formed on the advice of outside advisors-

Adams Capital, Inc., Perigee Group, and King & Spalding-and there is differing testimony as to
why this transaction took place. One explanation offered is it was part of a plan to avoid "sting
taxes." Sting taxes are assessed on S-corporations whose passive income exceeds 25% of total
gross receipts in any year. See I.R.C. § 1375. Ifan S-corporation incurs sting taxes for three
consecutive years, it can lose its S-corporation status. LOR was assessed sting taxes in 1987 so
it began investing in a series of low margin businesses with high gross receipts to avoid these

April of2003, three other management partnerships were formed: RfPS Management Company I, L.P., RFPS
Management Company II, L.P., and RFPS Management Company III, L.P. (collectively, the 'TIPS Management
Partnerships"). Rf A is the General Partner of each and the RFPS Investments Partnership with the corresponding
number is the sole limited partner of each. in exchange for these limited partnership interests, each RFPS
investments Partnership invested its Rollins Public Company stock in to the Management Partnerships. Therefore,
Rollins Public Company distributions actually go through the RfPS Management Partnerships which retain a
portion to pay expenses incurred by RFA with the rest going to RfPS Investment Partnerships
S [n
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sting taxes. The formation of the RFPS Partnerships in 2002 was part of a plan (the "RFPS
Plan") to further avoid the possibility of sting taxes.
RFPS Investment Partnerships would have preferred and common partners. The RFPS
Plan would pay 99% of profits to preferred partners and 1 % to common partners up to the
Annual Preferred Target. If the Annual Preferred Target was exceeded, common partners-would
be paid 99% and preferred partners would be paid 1 % of the amount distributed above the
Annual Preferred Target. Thus, preferred partners would receive preferred income and cash flow
stream from the RFPS Investment Partnerships. Glenn Grove testified this was the primary
purpose ofthe transaction. Common partners, like LOR, would receive a disproportionate share
of the anticipated long-term capital appreciation in the Rollins Public Company stock. Common
partnership status would result in less passive investment income for LOR and as a result, a
lower likelihood of incurring sting taxes, but LOR anticipated a greater long-term rate of return
on its investments. Each of the Plaintiffs were given information about the RFPS Plan in
November and December of2002 and were invited to invest their personal Rollins Public
Company stock in the RFPS Investment Partnerships and become preferred partners-Nancy

and

Wayne II elected to do so while Glen and Ellen declined. All of the LOR shareholders were
invited to participate as preferred partners except the Marital Trust and the Randall Marital Trust
which were the two largest LOR shareholders and the only two shareholders without interest in
other Rollins entities. The LOR Board voted for LOR to participate as a common partner. LOR
is the largest common partner and has 74% interest in each of the RFPS Investment Partnerships.
Plaintiffs have testified they were not provided meaningful information about the RFPS
Investment Partnerships, the consequences of LOR becoming a common partner, and the effect
on the distributions to the Marital Trust and Ruthie's lifetime interest.
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LOR Investment Company ("LORlC") was formed to act as general partner of each of
the RFPS Investment Partnerships.

LOR, as LORlC's sole member, would retain control over

the Rollins Public Company stock through LORlC. LORIC would determine distributions from
the RFPS Investments Partnerships. David Adams testified the purpose of the transaction was to
consolidate the Rollins Public Company stock into a control block. In December of2004,
however, Plaintiffs signed an Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of LORIC adding
new members and giving LOR 50% voting interest, Gary's children 25% voting interest, and
Randall's children 25% voting interest. All Plaintiffs signed LORIC resolutions establishing a
distribution plan for the RFPS Investment Partnerships on December 27,2004.

Plaintiffs have

testified they did not see the resolution itself, but were only given signature pages to sign. Three
of the four Plaintiffs signed a LORIC resolution placing a ceiling on the cash distributions to
preferred partners ofRFPS Investment Partnership I and II on March 15, 2005. However,
Plaintiffs say they were misled by a memorandum sent by Carson on instruction from Grove
stating the resolution's purpose was to "permit a higher distribution to their partners." They aver
they were not informed that these entities had actually received sufficient income to distribute
more than they did. There have been no changes to the distribution plans after these two events.
As a result of the RFPS Investment Partnerships' distribution

plans, LOR as a common partner

receives 1 % of distributions even though it held and contributed a lion's share of the Rollins
Public Company shares and is the 74% interest holder in the RFPS Investment Partnerships.
Since 2004, there has al ways been sufficient income in the RFPS Investment Partnerships to
exceed Annua1 Preferred Target, but each quarter, distributions have been held below that level.
Plaintiffs claim the RFPS Plan has harmed LOR, causing it to incur tax liabilities that can
exceed distributions.

Also, LOR has borrowed almost $65 million from the RFPS Investment
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Partnerships and is paying interest.

RFPS Investment Partnerships are accumulating substantial

amounts of money from capping distributions, and this money is being used to make loans to
other entities controlled by Gary and Randall at below market rates.
On March 23, 2016, LOR's Board added two independent directors, Thomas Claiborne
and Paul Morton.
participation

On April 4, 2016, the LOR Board asked these two directors to consider LOR's

in 2002 in the RFPS Investments Partnerships and LOR's decision in 2003, as the

sole member of LORIC, to cause LORIC, acting as the general partner of the RFPS Investments
Partnerships, to cause the RFPS Investments Partnerships to participate in the RFPS
Management Partnerships. As a part of their review, Morton and Claiborne received RFPS
Transaction documents, documents prepared by outside advisors at the time of the RFPS
Transaction, deposition transcripts of witnesses to the RFPS Transactions, and reports prepared
by experts for both Plaintiffs and Defendants in this litigation. On April 22, 2016, following
their review, Claiborne and Morton voted to approve and ratify the RFPS Transactions as they
believed they were in the best interest of LOR and its shareholders.
C. LOR's Businesses and Other Assets
LOR was created to invest public company dividends into private operating businesses,
but at present, LOR's only operating businesses are Rollins Ranches, LLC and Hydradyne, LLC.
LOR has also invested in ranch property in Florida, Texas, and Georgia for cattle and hunting
operations conducted through Rollins Ranches. LOR leases small tracts on some of these
properties to Gary and Randall at below market rates. These leases have not been made
available to other LOR shareholders. Gary and Randall have built homes and improvements on
the leased tracts for personal use and they are responsible for expenses associated with the leased
properties. When Gary or Randall or others hunted on certain properties, they sometimes paid a
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hunt fee. Although Gary and Randall paid all building and grounds expenses for a while, they
ultimately developed a new reimbursement approach that reduced the reimbursement amounts
and have at times written off the amount of reimbursements due to LOR. Rollins Ranches has
operated at a loss since 1993 and is not expected to be a profitable business. LOR has loaned
Rollins Ranches almost $75 million since 1994 and Rollins Ranches has no ability or intention to
repay these loans. Plaintiffs believed the properties were owned by Gary and Randall, not by
LOR until August of2010. Plaintiffs have not been allowed use of the ranch properties since
August of2010 and have been allowed to hunt only upon invitation by Gary or Randall.
LOR also owns a corporate Gulfstream III plane. Rollins, Inc. owned a Jetstar II and
swapped it for its own Gulfstream III in 2003. Rollins, Inc. and LOR each pay its own aircraft
maintenance fees, but they share the planes with each entity paying for the fuel and expenses for
use for each flight regardless of which entity owns the plane. Until 2015, Gary and Randall were
charged $1,000 per hour for personal use of the planes, though this rate did not cover the price of
fue1. Randall's trips that were both personal and business were reported as business trips. Other
LOR shareholders may use the plane only by invitation of Gary and Randall.
Finally, LOR owns a corporate bus for business and personal use. Since the early 1990s,
Gary and Randall have paid $1,500 per quarter for personal use, a price established by O. Wayne
Rollins when he was LOR President. In 2003, LOR commissioned the construction of a luxury
bus. Plaintiffs were told this was Randall's personal bus, not LOR's.
Additionally, from 2005 to 2012, LOR has loaned $80.7 million to these other Rollins
entities controlled by Gary and Randall and $35.5 million to Gary and Randall individually at
below market rates. For example, LOR loaned RFT Investment Company, LLC C'RFT"), an
entity controlled by Gary and Randall, over $25 million and RFT used the money to buy RPC,
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Inc. stock. Now, LOR receives interest on the loan instead of receiving the earned dividends
from the RPC stock. Although Gary and Randall have taken personal loans from LOR to
purchase stocks, other LOR members have not been given the opportunity to borrow LOR
money. In some instances LOR borrowed money from outside lenders at higher rates to loan the

money to other Rollins Entities at lower rates.
D. LOR Dividends
Over time, LOR has reduced the percentage ofinvestrnent income paid out as dividends.
From the mid-1980s through September of 1999, LOR Board paid 70% of its investment income
in dividends and paid out other special dividends for taxes, family meetings, and educational
programs. In December of 1999, LOR Board decreased its dividend payments to 35% because
investment income had decreased significantly and to ensure proper reserves to fund operations
and for long-term capital appreciation. LOR still made the special distributions. Plaintiffs
contend the LOR distribution. reductions were for the purpose of ensuring the Marital Trust not
receive a windfall or have a surplus. Ruthie's marital allowance was $20,000 a month ($240,000
annually) before the Marital Trust was established and Gary paid this out of personal funds until
January 1997, when he started using the Marital Trust as the source of allowance funds. In 1997
and 1998, the Marital Trust funds exceeded her allowance. Around this same time, Ruthie had
discontinued the payment of Gary's taxes from the Marital Trust account, as further discussed
below. After this reduction to 35%, the distribution to the Marital Trust was $300,000 annually
and Gary increased Ruthie's allowance to $25,000 a month.

In 2003, LOR Board decided to

convert from a fluctuating dividend based on investment income to a fixed quarterly dividend.
LOR distributed $150,000 the first quarter of 2003 and $400,000 the remaining quarters in 2003.
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In 2004, LOR's fixed quarterly dividend was set at $500,000 quarterly ($2 million annually)
regardless of LOR's financial performance.
Approximately $14 million of Marital Trust income from LOR dividends were used to
pay Ruthie and Gary's joint tax obligations.

In 1994 and 1995, approximately $5.675 million

was transferred from the Marital Trust account at Northern Trust directly to Gary's Northern
Trust bank account and payments to the IRS and Georgia DOR were made from Gary's account
towards the joint tax obligations.

Plaintiffs did not know about or authorize these transactions.

From 1996 to July 1998, $1,370,000

in funds were transferred from the Northern Trust Marital

Trust account to Ruthie's Northern Trust bank account and then to Gary's account to make
payments towards tax obligations.

In July 1998 after discovering the transfers from her account

to Gary's, Ruthie demanded complete control over this account and told Grove that no transfers
could be made without her consent.

When such requests to transfer were made, she refused to

consent. These transfers and tax payments were coordinated by Grove on behalf of LOR as the
seat of the Rollins family office.
In support of these transfers, Defendants rely on several documents prepared by George
Strobel of Arthur Anderson in which he stated the Marital Trust income distributed to Ruthie
would be used to pay Gary and Ruthie's joint tax obligations.

Strobel testified at his deposition

that Ruthie could consent to using her distribution from the Marital Trust to pay Gary's tax
liabilities, but nothing in the Marital Trust instrument authorized Gary to do so. Grove avered
King & Spalding advised him it was appropriate for LOR to make tax payments on behalf of its

shareholders, including payment from the Marital Trust for Gary and Ruthie's joint tax
liabilities. From 2001 to 2008, instead of LOR making distributions to the shareholders directly,
LOR directed the pro rata distributions due to shareholders to be paid directly to the taxing
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authorities, including $8,336,311 owed to the Marital Trust. The eight special distributions that
were made of the Marital Trust's pro rata share were checks listing the taxpayer as "Gary W.
Rollins."

During this time frame, Ruthie had not yet elected to file ajoint return with Gary.

The Marital Trust instrument states the Marital Trust is irrevocable, Gary has no right to
or interest in the property of the Marital Trust, and all income must be paid to Ruthie. Grove
states he understood that Ruthie and Plaintiffs agreed to these payments, but Ruthie avers she
never agreed to the use of the Marital Trust income to pay taxes. The Marital Trust was required
to make distributions to Ruthie at least on a quarterly basis.

E. tu« Rollins Family Fractures
At a family meeting on August 10, 2010, Plaintiffs were asked to sign certain documents
related to a proposed perpetual management trust ("RPMT"). They refused to sign and have
testified they began to lose faith in Gary and Randall at this meeting. On August 20, 20 I0,
Plaintiffs filed a separate lawsuit for an accounting against Gary and Randall as the trustees of
the Rollins Children's Trust for breaching their duties to Plaintiffs as beneficiaries of those

trusts.f Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs stopped receiving distributions from other trusts and
entities, and Glen was fired from his position as Orkin's CEO and President. On December 8,
2010, Carson emailed Plaintiffs seeking direction regarding the Marital Trust. In January of
2011, RF A discontinued financial administration and tax preparation on behalf of the Marital
Trust.
On August 25,2010, Ruthie filed for divorce from Gary. As a part of the divorce
settlement agreement dated February 12, 2013, Gary offered to buy Ruth's lifetime income
interest in the Marital Trust for $5 million and Ruth agreed to seek the approval of the Trustees
for this transaction.
6

On March 13, 2013, Plaintiffs asked for documents and information from

LOR was later added to this separate suit as a Defendant.
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the divorce case related to the Marital Trust and later decided they did not have enough
information to determine if the offer was fair and did not approve of the sale by the April 1,
2013, divorce case deadline.
Glen, on behalf of the Marital Trust trustees, sent two informal requests for LOR
documents on AprilS, 2013, and July 24, 2013, a formal request for inspection of records under
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602

on October 1,2013,

and a follow up request on January 7, 2014. Though

Plaintiffs received additional documents on March 20, 2014, they were not satisfied that all the
necessary records had been produced.
The Trustees allege that over the course of their investigation related to Gary's $5 million
offer, they discovered various wrongdoings by Defendants. On July 2S, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed
their Complaint against Gary, Randall, and LOR which includes seven Counts: 1) Inspection of
Records, 2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 3) Conversion, 4) Payment of Dividends Owed, 5) Unjust
Enrichment, 6) Dissolution, and 7) Attorneys' Fees.

n. Standard of Review
Summary Judgment should be granted when the movant shows "that there is no genuine
/

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
O.C.G.A.
depositions

§ 9-11-56(c).

A party may do this by "showing the court the documents, affidavits,

and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a

jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff's case."

Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622,

623-24 (2010); Scarborough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829, 829 (1999).

To avoid summary

judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise

provided in this Code section, must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A.
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§ 9-11-56(e).

The Court

views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Morgan v. Barnes, 221

Ga. App. 653, 654 (1996). "[M]ere speculation, conjecture, or possibility [are] insufficient to
preclude summary judgment." State v. Rozier, 288 Ga. 767, 768 (20 II); see Pafford v. Biomet,
264 Ga. 540, 544 (l994) (finding mere speculation did not give rise to a genuine issue of
material fact). "Hearsay, opinions, and conclusions in affidavits are inadmissible on summary
judgment." Langley v. Nat'l Labor Grp., Inc., 262 Ga. App. 749, 751 (2003).

The party

opposing summary judgment must show more than a "shadowy semblance of an issue." Cochran
MiLL Assocs. v. Stephens, 286 Ga. App. 241, 242 (2007).

III. Statute of Limitations
Defendants argue several Counts 1 are barred by the four year statute of limitations for
certain acts occurring before July 25,2010, while Plaintiffs argue the statute ofIimitations was
tolled by Defendants' fraudulent concealment of Plaintiffs' status as Trustee of the Marital Trust.
The statute oflimitations can be tolled in circumstances of actual fraud which debarred or
deterred Plaintiffs from bringing the action. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96. "In order to establish fraudulent
concealment under this statute sufficient to toll the statute of limitation, a plaintiff must prove
that: (1) the defendant committed actual fraud involving moral turpitude, (2) the fraud concealed
the cause of action from the plaintiff, and (3) the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to
discover his cause of action despite his failure to do so within the applicable statute of
limitation." Cochran Mil! Assocs. v. Stephens, 286 Ga. App. 241,245 (2007). Ifactual fraud is
the gravamen of the underlying complaint, no further independent fraudulent act is required to
toll the statute, the statute is tolled until the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered
through reasonable diligence, and "[sjilence is treated as a continuation of the original actual
Defendants claim Counts II and V for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment are partly barred to the extent
they rely on conduct before July 25,20 I 0, and Counts ill and IV for conversion and payment of dividends owed are
completely barred.
7
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fraud." Shipman v. Horizon Corp., 245 Ga. 808,808 (1980). If actual fraud is not the gravamen

of the underlying complaint, plaintiffs must show a separate independent actual fraud involving
moral turpitude which debars or deters plaintiffs from bringing their action and "mere silence" is
not enough to toll the statute of limitations. ld. at 809. In either case, "[a] confidential
relationship imposes a greater duty on the parties to reveal what should be revealed and a
lessened duty to discover independently wbat could have been discovered through the exercise of
ordinary care. Hendry v. Wells, 286 Ga. App. 774 (2007); see also Smith v. Sun/Trust Bank, 325
Ga. App. 531, 538 (2014), cert. denied (Sept. 8, 2014) ("when a confidential relationship exists,
such as between [tbe trustee and beneficiaries of a trust], the plaintiffs duty to investigate is
decreased, and the defendant's duty to disclose is increased. In such situations, silence when one
should speak, or failure to discIose what ought to be disclosed, is as much a fraud in law as is an
actual false representation.").
"Generally speaking, the question of whether there was fraudulent concealment justifying
the tolling of the limitation period is a proper question for determination by a jury under proper
instructions from the court." Sun Trust Bank, 325 Ga. App at 539 (citing Brown v. Brown, 209
Ga. 620, 622(7) (1953». Likewise, "[w]hether a [party] exercised reasonable care in discovering
the fraud is generally a jury question." Id. at 541 (quoting Federal Ins. Co. v. Westside Supply
Co., 264 Ga. App. 240, 243(2), 590 S.E.2d 224 (2003». However, in certain circumstances,

these issues can be determined as a matter of law. For instance, in Sun'Irust the Court of
Appeals noted that a party may fail to exercise due diligence as a matter of law, particularly in
cases where actual notice was sent of certain transactions later asserted to be concealed. Id. at
544. Likewise, the Court of Appeal's affirmed a grant of summary judgment in a case where
beneficiaries challenged a loan made by the trustee from the trust. See Mayfield v. Heiman, 317
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Ga. App. 322 (2012). The beneficiaries signed documents related to the loan when the loan was
closed and there was no evidence the trustee did anything to deter the beneficiaries from hiring
an attorney or advisor to review documents before signing them or to deter them filing a lawsuit
within the statute of limitations period. Id. at 328(2). Further, the Court of Appeals found no
evidence showing the beneficiaries exercised any diligence to discover fraud. ld.
Here, fraud has not been raised as a claim and is not the gravamen of the Complaint and
therefore Plaintiffs must present independent evidence of actual fraud to toll the statute of
limitations. Plaintiffs aver Gary and Randall fraudulently concealed from Plaintiffs their status
as Trustees of the Marital Trust and Gary held himself out as the Trustee of the Marital Trust for
his lifetime. Plaintiffs have presented evidence of actions taken on behalf of the' Rollins Family
Office on behalf of the Marital Trust at Gary's instruction without informing or seeking the
consent of Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs testified the Rollins family was very secretive about its finances

and they were often given signature pages to sign without the benefit of the actual document.
However, the signature pages signed by Plaintiffs list them as "trustees," "co-trustees," or
fiduciaries.

Given this evidence, the factfinder cannot find the requisite intent to conceal from

Plaintiffs their role as Trustee of the Marital Trust.
Further, Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence demonstrating any diligence in
uncovering this purported fraudulent concealment. Even if Gary and Randall intended to conceal
from Plaintiffs that they were Trustees of the Marital Trust, Plaintiffs should have been alerted to
their role as Trustee when they were given Marital Trust documents to sign. Even if they were
only given signature. pages, there is no evidence Plaintiffs asked for copies of the documents they
were signing, or requested other information or clarification as to the purpose of the documents,
Assuming, without deciding, the existence of a confidential relationship between Plaintiffs and
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Defendants, a confidential relationship lessens Plaintiffs' duty to discover fraud, but does not
completely eliminate their duty of diligence. See Mayfield at 326(2) (quoting Cochran Mills

Assocs., 286 Ga. App. at 247(2)).
Plaintiffs also contend LOR, by and through Gary and Randall as officers, directors, and
controlling shareholders, acting as the Rollins Family Office and administrators of the Marital
Trust, concealed certain information about the administration of the Marital Trust and the
management of LOR Specifically, LOR pulled money from the Marital Trust to pay Gary's tax
liabilities from 1993 until 1998. However, Ruthie, the beneficiary of the Marital Trust, made
inquiries in 1998 about withdrawals from her Marital Trust account, demanded she be notified
about future withdrawals, and subsequently refused requests to make distributions from her
aCC01.mt. Plaintiffs, as Trustees of the Marital Trust, signed the Northern Trust Master Custody
Agreement which gave them access to the Marital Trust account. Again, this evidence
demonstrates a lack of intentional concealment by Defendants. Further, there is no evidence
Plaintiffs acted with any diligence to discover why their permission was needed to give the
Rollins Family Office access to the Marital Trust accounts and what type of withdrawals would
be made from the Marital Trust account. Thus, even assuming Defendants' intentionally
concealed their withdrawals from the Marital Trust accounts to cover Gary's tax liabilities there
is no evidence of diligence on the part of Plaintiffs to discover the fraud.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue the breach of fiduciary claim sounds in fraud because they allege
bad faith and fraudulent intent. Plaintiffs claim Gary and Randall's self-dealing, corporate
waste, and suppression of LOR dividends to injure the Marital Trust were independent acts of
fraud. Plaintiffs complain about the transfer of LOR assets to the RFPS Investment Partnerships
and the resulting depreciation of dividends to the Marital Trust. However, the undisputed
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evidence shows the RFPS Partnership transactions were not concealed from Plaintiffs.

Three of

the four Plaintiffs signed LORIC resolutions in 2005 in their capacity as members setting a
ceiling on cash distributions to RFPS lnvestment Partnership partners.

Plaintiffs claim a memo

given to them at the time was misleading because it stated the resolution's purpose was to
"permit a higher distribution to their partners." They aver they were not informed that these
entities had actually received sufficient income to distribute more than they did. However, there
is again no evidence Plaintiffs were deterred from hiring a separate attorney or advisor to review
the transaction or were deterred from filing a lawsuit. See Mayfieldat 328. Even if, as they

contend, they were only given signature pages to sign related to the RFPS Transactions, there is
no evidence they undertook any level of diligence to uncover the purportedly concealed
information.
Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence of actual fraud as required to toll the
limitations period. The extent to which the statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs' claims is
discussed below as it relates to each claim.
IV. Count 1 - Inspection of Records
Defendants argue extensive discovery in this case has rendered the claim for inspection
of records under O.CG.A. § 14-2-1602 moot. See Rigby v, Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop., 327 Ga.
App. 29,37 n.7 (2014) (noting claims for inspection of corporate records appear to be moot since
trial court ordered defendant to allow plaintiffs to inspect records and Plaintiffs "received
voluminous corporate records regarding their accounts during discovery in this case"). The court
may order inspection of records improperly withheld at the corporation's expense. O.C.G.A. §
14-2-1604.

However, Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence of any corporate records that

were requested but not produced for inspection. Plaintiffs did not seek an order from the Court
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requiring LOR to comply with Plaintiffs' demands on an expedited basis. O.C.G.A. § 14-21604(b). To the extent this Count seeks a judicial remedy for failure to produce or allow for
inspection of records, the claim is moot.
Plaintiffs argue their claim survives because Plaintiffs' pre-litigation demands for
inspection of records were not fully met and the factfinder could award attorneys' fees under
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-1 1 if Defendants violated this statute in bad faith. See GIR Systems, Inc. v.

Lance, 228 Ga. App. 329, 332(7) (1997) (affirming award of attorneys' fees by trial court in
contempt action because evidence supported finding that party acted in bad faith, been
stubbornly litigious, and caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense by not providing
the information ordered to be produced under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1604).

However, Plaintiffs have

a separate claim for attorneys' fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (Count VII) and have alleged no
other damages or relief sought under this particular C01.mt.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I for inspection of records is
GRANTED.

IV. Count ll- Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Plaintiffs allege Defendants Gary and Randall breached their fiduciary duties to the
Marital Trust in a variety of ways, including: (A) entering into the RFPS Transactions which
depressed dividends declared by LOR; (B) deliberately depressing LOR dividends declared and
distributed; (C) failing to cause LOR to pay dividends declared and owed to the Marital Trust
and paying Gary's tax liabilities related to the Marital Trust from the Marital Trust distributions;
and (D) purchasing and maintaining ranches, R V s, and aircraft on behalf of LOR that were
ultimately used for personal use. Each of the alleged breaches is discussed in turn.
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A. RFPS Transactions
Count II for breach of fiduciary duty includes allegations related to the RFPS
Transactions. In December of2002, LOR contributed its Rollins Public Company stock to the
RFPS Investment Partnerships and the stock was ultimately contributed to RFPS Management
Partnerships in 2003 (the "RFPS Transactions"). The current distribution policies for the RFPS
Investment Partnerships were set by non-party LORIC, the general partner, in 2005 or earlier.
Therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment on Count II for breach of fiduciary duty as it
relates to the RFPS Transactions is GRANTED as barred by the statute of limitations as
discussed above in Section III. However, to provide a complete record, the Court will consider
Defendants' other bases for dismissal.
1.

Approval by Claiborne and Morton
Defendants argue Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim based on Gary and Randall's

conflicting interest as both LOR directors and shareholders and the self-dealing nature of the
RFPS Transactions must be dismissed because two independent directors appointed in 2016
retroactively approved the conflicted interest transaction pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-861 &862. These statutes provide a safe harbor for conflicted director transactions if at least two
qualified directors affirm the transaction after required disclosures. See O.C.O.A. § 14-2-862(a).
Plaintiffs ·first argue the safe harbor provision does not apply because the RFPS
Transactions were not "director's conflicting interest transactions" under O.C.O.A. § 14-2-860(2)
under which a transaction must be effected by a director in which he has a conflicted interest.
Gary and Randall, as two of three directors of the LOR Board voted to invest LOR's stock in the
RFPS Investment Partnerships, and therefore effected the transaction as directors. At the time of
the transactions, the common partners ofRFPS Investment Partnerships included Grace Rollins
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(mother), several of Gary and Randall's children, trusts to which Randall and Gary were trustees,
and entities for which Randall and Gary also serve as directors and officers, such as RHC. A
transaction can be conflicted if "[the director] or a relatedperson is a party to the transaction or

has a beneficial interest in or so closely linked to the transaction and of such financial
significance to the director or a related person that it would reasonably be expected to exert an
influence on the director's judgment." See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-60(1 )(A) (emphasis added). Gary
and Randall's mother, children, trusts, and entities who all participated in the RFPS Transactions
as preferred partners meet the definition of related person under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-860(a)(3).
Therefore, the Court 'finds the RFPS Transactions qualify as director conflicting interest
transactions and the safe harbor provision is applicable if the conditions are met.
Plaintiffs next argue the ex post facto approval of the RFPS Transactions by the new
directors should not be allowed because it subverts the role of the judiciary. The directors
approved and ratified the transactions on April 22, 2016, a few days before the filing of the
Motion for Summary Judgment and more than a decade after the RFPS Transactions took place.
However, the plain Language of the statute makes clear that independent director approval may
take place at any time-before or after the transaction. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-861(b)(1) (a
conflicted director's action cannot be set aside on the grounds of conflicting interest if the ...
Directors' action respecting the transaction was at any time taken in compliance with Code
Section 14-2-862"); see also O.C.G.A. § 14-2-862, Comments (" Action complying with
subsection 14-2-862(a) may be taken by the board of directors at any time-before or after the
transaction."). Had the legislature intended for the approval to occur within a reasonable time
following the transaction they couId have so legislated.
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Finally, having determined that the transactions were conflicting, the Court next
considers whether Claiborne and Morton were qualified directors, received the required
disclosures from Gary and Randall, and conducted a diligent review of the transactions. See
O.C.G.A.

§ 14-2-862(a).

Plaintiffs argue Morton and Claiborne are not "qualified" because they

receive a salary from LOR and can be removed by the majority shareholders of LOR, i.e., Gary
and Randall. A "qualified director" is "any director who does not have either (1) a conflicting
interest respecting the transaction or (2) a familial, financial, professional, or employment
relationship with a second director who does have a conflicting interest respecting the
transaction, which relationship would, in the circumstances, reasonably be expected to exert an
influence on the first director's judgment when voting on the transaction."

O.C.G.A. § 14-2-

862( d). The statute, however, cannot be read to prohibit a relationship between an otherwise
qualified director and the business corporation itself.

Presumably, most ifnot all paid directors

will be viewed to have a professional and financial relationship with the corporation.

The statute

does not prohibit these relationships, but rather prohibits a separate relationship with the
conflicted director. Here, there is no evidence of a "familial, financial, professional, or
employment relationship" between Morton and Claiborne on one hand and Gary and Randall on
the other. Thus, the Court finds Morton and Claiborne are "qualified" as required by O.C.G.A. §
14-2-862( d).
Next, Plaintiffs argue Morton and Claiborne did not receive complete required disclosure
from Gary and Randall. '''Required disclosure' means disclosure by the director who has a
conflicting interest of (A) the existence and nature of his conflicting interest, and (B) all facts
known to him respecting the subject matter of the transaction that

an ordinarily

prudent person

would reasonably believe to be material to a judgment as to whether or not to proceed with the

22

transaction."

O.C.G.A.

§ 14-2-860(4).

The evidence shows Morton and Claiborne were

provided documents created by outside advisors, Adams Capital, Inc. and Perigee Group, at the
time of the RFPS Transactions.

They were also given access to documents created in the course

of tills litigation, including expert reports from Plaintiffs and Defendants, pleadings, discovery
responses, and Plaintiffs' depositions.

They interviewed Grove, Randall, and Gary as well as

several officers. They were advised by independent counsel. These documents disclose the
existence and nature of the conflict as asserted by Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs have not presented

evidence of a withheld fact which an ordinary prudent person would believe to be material in
reviewing the RFPS Transactions.8

Thus, the Court finds the disclosure met the requirements of

the safe harbor statute.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue Morton and Claiborne's conclusion that Gary and Randall acted
in the best interest of LOR and its shareholders should be disregarded because they did not
review the RFPS Transactions with the requisite diligence. Directors must act "[i]n a manner he
believes in good faith to be in the best interest of the corporation." O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(a)(I);
Enchanted Valley RV Resort, Ltd. v. Weese, 241 Ga. App. 415, 423 (1999) ("A corporate officer
or director owes to the corporation and its stockholders a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty, which
requires that they act in utmost good faith."). A director's decision is only protected by the
business judgment rule when it is "reasonably informed by due diligence." FDIC v. Loudermilk,
295 Ga. 579, 581, 584 (2014). Georgia common law gives directors wide latitude to manage the
affairs of the corporation so long as they are not acting "blindly, recklessly, or heedlessly" or

~ Plaintiffs combine their arguments about requisite disclosure and due diligence, but the safe harbor statute sets out
disclosures, not diligence, requirements. Evidence that Morton did not remember or understand certain
ramifications of the RFPS Transactions to individual shareholders is not evidence Gary and Randall did not make
requisite disclosures. Whether Gary and Randall made proper disclosures about the RFPS Transaction as required
under the safe harbor provision is a separate inquiry from whether or not Morton and Claiborne's review of the
disclosures was sufficiently diligent to sufficiently inform their conclusion that the transactions were in the best
interests of LOR.
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acting "as mere dummies or figureheads." Id. at 580-81.

In other words, the courts distinguish

between how the decision was made (the process was one of "unthinking acquiescence") and the
ultimate merit or wisdom of the business decision. Id. at 582. The directors must act with the
care of an "ordinarily prudent person in a like position" and is entitled to rely on opinions of
reliable and competent officers and employees of the corporation, legal counsel, accountants, or
other professionals. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(b)(1) & (2).
As evidence oflack of diligence, Plaintiffs argue Morton was unable to answer questions
about the RFPS Transactions at his July 18 deposition, approximately three months after
ratifying the RFPS Transactions. Plaintiffs also argue the review occurred in less than a month
which was insufficient time to review the complex transaction. Defendants respond a memory
test should not be the applicable test for due diligence. The Court finds Plaintiffs have not
presented evidence the process used by Morton and Claiborne to review the transaction was not
sufficiently diligent. Given the review took place after the RFPS Transactions occurred, Morton
and Claiborne actually had access to more information than was available at the time of the
RFPS Transactions. The Court is not persuaded that failing to remember certain aspects of a
complex transaction indicates the process was faulty. Therefore, Defendants may avail
themselves of the safe harbor provision and the business judgment rule applies to the actions of
Gary and Randall.9

The Court finds the safe harbor provision removes the conflict of interest from the analysis but does not remove
Gary and Randall's duty to comply with the business judgment rule or completely immunize them from a claim of
breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs argue conflicted controlling shareholders like Gary and Randall cannot take
advantage of the safe harbor provision. However, the challenged decisions were made by the LOR Board, not by
shareholders. The Court does not agree that a conflicted director can lose safe harbor protections by having a dual
role as director and controlling shareholder.

9
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2.

The Business Judgment Rule
Having established the business judgment rule applies to Gary and Randall's decision to

undertake the RFPS Transactions, we look to whether the transaction was conducted in bad faith
to the minority shareholders.

Plaintiffs have presented evidence from which the factfinder might

conclude the RFPS Transactions were undertaken in bad faith or to intentionally harm minority
shareholders' interest in LOR. The ultimate structure provided large short-term gain to all the
original LOR shareholders except the two Marital Trusts and provided long-term capital
appreciation to the Marital Trust, a benefit of little value a shareholder with only a lifetime
income interest.

There is evidence that supports Plaintiffs contention the RFPS Transactions

were structures in a way to limit cash flow to LOR for the purpose of depriving the Marital Trust
of cash. Likewise, Defendants have presented evidence from which the factfinder might
conclude the RFPS Transactions were undertaken in good faith for legitimate business purposes,
such as avoiding sting taxes or maintaining asset control, and were fair to the minority
shareholders. Defendants present evidence they relied on the advice of a trove of outside
advisors to devise this wealth management scheme and the long term capital appreciation
realized and tax benefits gained through these transactions was in the best interest of LOR and all
its shareholders.

The factfinder could, after considering the evidence, determine the directors

acted in bad faith, and the application of the business judgment rule is not independent grounds
for dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claim as it relates to the RFPS Transactions.
3.

RFPS Distribution Decisions
Defendants argue Plaintiffs are estopped from complaining about distributions from the

RFPS Investment Partnerships because they approved of the distribution policies as members of
LORIC. "[S]hareholders in a corporation who participate in the performance of an act or who
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acquiesce and ratify the same are estopped even in equity to complain thereof." Medlin v.

Carpenter, 174 Ga. App. 50, 52 (1985) (finding former employee and minority shareholder was
estopped from bringing a claim for a bonus and a dividend based on majority shareholder and
president's receipt of a bonus based on percentage of profits because former employee approved
the disputed bonus in his capacity as a director); see also Clayton v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta,
237 Ga. 604, 604 (1976) (finding wife who served as co-trustee and co-executor of husband's
will was estopped from complaining about changes to trust property to which she agreed in
writing).
In December of 2004, Plaintiffs each signed documents establishing distribution policies
for each of the RFPS Investment Partnerships setting distribution amounts below the Annual
Preferred Target. In March, 2005, three of the four Plaintiffs signed a LORIe resolution on
behalf of themselves which raised the quarterly distributions for two of the three RFPS
Investment Partnerships while still maintaining distribution amount below the Annual Preferred
Target. The distribution policies for the RFPS Investment Partnerships have not been changed
since that time. Plaintiffs claim they were only given signature pages and did not understand
what they were signing. However, "the only type of fraud that can relieve a party of his
obligation to read a written contract and be bound by its terms is a fraud that prevents the party
from reading the contract." Legacy Acad., Inc. v. Mamilove, LLC, 297 Ga. 15, 17 (2015). There
is no evidence Plaintiffs were prohibited from asking for full copies of the documents they were
asked to sign or to ask questions regarding those contracts, or even employ outside advisors.
Instead, they only claim to have been misled by a memo from Grove stating the resolution would
"permit a higher distribution to their partners" even though that statement is true. Plaintiffs
argue the memo was misleading because it failed to mention there would be more income
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coming into the RFPS Investment Partnerships than would be distributed.

Whether Plaintiffs

fully understood the distribution policies ofRFPS Investment Partnerships, they signed LORIC
documents ratifying the policy and cannot now rely on their failure to fully comprehend the
consequences of the policy to challenge that same policy. Therefore, the estoppel argument
raised by Defendants is independent grounds for dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claim
as it relates to the distribution policies ofRFPS Investment Partnerships.

4.

Equitable Relief
Defendants' argue equitable relief sought against RFPS Investment Partnerships cannot

be sought because they are non-parties. Plaintiffs respond they have contemplated several
appropriate remedies, such as forcing Defendants to liquidate the RFPS Investment Partnerships,
ordering RFPS Investment Partnerships to make distributions above the Annual Preferred Target,
and to distribute money sitting in RFPS Investment Partnerships' accounts to LOR and then
order LOR to distribute Marital Trust's share to it. The Court finds no legal basis for granting
equitable relief against non-parties, including RFPS Investment Partnerships, RFPS Management
Partnerships, LORIC as General Partner of the RFPS Investment Partnerships, and LORIC's
non-party members, including Randall's children who hold 25% voting interest. As such, any
claim for equitable relief as a result of a breach of fiduciary duty related to the RFPS
Transactions is dismissed as a matter oflaw. See Barham v. City a/Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375, 379
(2013) ("Trial courts 'may not grant an enforcement order or injunction so broad as to make
punishable the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights have not been
adjudged according to law. ''') (quoting Regal Knitwear Co. v. Nat. Labor Relations Bd., 324
U.S. 9, 13 (1945)).
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In sum, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs'

breach of fiduciary duty claim as it relates to the RFPS Transactions as barred by application of
the statute of limitations as discussed above in Section III In the absence of a statute of
limitations argument, Defendants' Motion would be GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' claim for
breach offiduciary duty claim as it relates to the RFPS distribution policies and Plaintiffs'
request for equitable relief. Otherwise, the Motion would be DENIED.
B.

LOR Dividend Policies
Count IT for breach of fiduciary duty includes allegations related to certain LOR dividend

policies. In 2003, LOR Board decided to convert from a fluctuating dividend based on
investment income to a fixed quarterly dividend. In 2004, LOR's current fixed quarterly
dividend was set at $500,000 quarterly ($2 million annually) regardless of LOR's financial
performance. The Court of Appeals in a related case determined there were no fact questions to
support a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Gary and Randall arising from the reduction of
pro rata dividends paid from LOR compared with prior years. [0 The Court of Appeals noted
Gary and Randall were authorized under the LOR Articles of Incorporation to set dividends and
concluded "to the extent that the Plaintiffs are claiming that Gary and Randall have reduced the
pro rata dividends paid through LOR and RHC compared with prior years, or have retained
earnings, we find no breach of fiduciary duty and no fact questions because Gary and Randall
had authority through the corporate bylaws to make those decisions." Rollins v. Rollins, 338 Ga.
App. 308,323(3) (2016), reconsideration denied (July 27,2016), cert petition denied (April 17,
2017). This Court finds this precludes a claim brought by Plaintiffs in this case on behalf of the
Marital Trust, another minority interest holder in LOR. Therefore, the Motion for Summary

10 In this related case, Plaintiffs, in their capacity as beneficiaries of certain Trusts that held minority interest in
LOR, sued Defendants Gary and Randall, in their capacity as trustees of the Trusts and as directors of LOR.
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Judgment on Count II for breach of fiduciary duty as it relates to LOR's dividend policies is
GRANTED.

11

C. Diverting Marital Trust Dividends to Pay Gary's Tax Liability
Plaintiffs claim Gary and Randall breached their fiduciary duties to the Marital Trust
when they caused LOR to withdraw money from the Marital Trust account to satisfy Gary
Rollins's tax liabilities. The last withdrawal from the Marital Trust account without Ruth's
approval was in 1998. Plaintiffs' also claim Gary and Randall breached their fiduciary duties to
the Marital Trust when they caused LOR distributed money owed to the Marital Trust from LOR
directly to the taxing authorities. These distributions were made between 2001 and 2008 and
therefore the claim is time-barred as discussed in Section III above. Therefore, the Motion for
Summary Judgment on Count II for breach of fiduciary duty as it relates to LOR's dividend
payments is GRANTED as barred by the statute of limitations. However, to provide a complete
record, the Court win consider Defendants' other bases for dismissal.
Defendants argue any claims related to the use of Marital Trust funds to pay Gary's tax
liabilities are barred because Plaintiffs authorized LOR to administer the Marital Trust and LOR
directed the transfer of funds to pay Ruthie and Gary's joint tax liability pursuant to that
authority. In response, Plaintiffs argue neither they nor Ruthie authorized LOR to violate the
Marital Trust instrument by sending funds to Gary's account and to tax authorities. The Marital
Trust instrument expressly stated it was a grantor trust, Gary retained no "right, title, or interest
in or power, privilege, or incident of ownership" in the Marital Trust assets, and Ruthie would
receive "all of the trust income, in quarterly or more frequent installments, until her death." The
intent of LOR's outside advisors to pay Gary's grantor tax liabilities using Marital Trust funds is
II Defendants also argue Plaintiffs are seeking impermissible speculative damages. The Court believes the expert
opinions presented in evidence by Plaintiffs would create a fact question and would not be a basis for dismissal of
the breach of fiduciary duty claim as it relates to the LOR distribution policies.
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unavailing in the face of the clear and unambiguous trust instrument.

At best, there is a dispute

of material fact whether Ruthie agreed to this tax payment plan or not. It is clear she expressly
disapproved of the tax payment plan in July of 1998 when she asked that no more money be
withdrawn from the Northern Trust Marital Trust account without her permission and later
rejected requests to make payments from that account.
Defendants further argue Ruthie benefitted from the use of the Marital Trust funds
because they were used to pay the joint tax liability and therefore, she would be unjustly
enriched if she were to receive the amount of trust funds used to reduce the tax liability she was
jointly and several1y owed. Plaintiffs respond the $14 million taken from the Marital Trust was
separate property belonging to Ruthie and was tax-free for her under the express terms of the
Trust Instrument. The funds were taken each year before Ruthie elected to file a joint return with
her husband and therefore when the money was taken, there was no joint obligation to pay taxes.
Further, Plaintiffs note in 1994 Ruthie only claimed $61,671 in taxable income out of more than
$22 million total income. Therefore her share of tax liability wouLd be far less than the
$5,675,000 taken from the Marital Trust that year to pay tax liabilities, and thus Ruthie did not
assent to or benefit from the use of Marital Trust funds to pay her comparatively insignificant tax
liabili ties.
Finally, Defendants argue that while Ruthie as beneficiary did not have authority to
release claims held by the Marital Trust, Ruthie would be prohibited from accepting any
proceeds from the claim under the terms of her settlement agreement from Ruthie and Gary's
divorce. Any Marital Trust funds that were wrongfully taken from the Trust would have been
paid out to Ruthie as the beneficiary under the terms of the Marital Trust instrument.
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This

circuity of action argument was previously raised in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and rejected
by the Court and is not now differently persuaded.
As such, in the absence of a statute of limitations bar, Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Claims II as it relates to the use of Marital Trust dividends to pay taxes would be
DENIED.

D. Corporate Waste: Ranches, Planes, Bus, and Loans
Plaintiffs allege Gary and Randall committed corporate waste related to certain assets
acquired and maintained by LOR and used by Gary and Randall for personal use, including
ranch and hunting properties, planes and a bus. The Court must ask two separate questions: (1)
was there a rational business purpose for LOR to purchase the assets and (2) was the company
fairly compensated for the director's personal use of LOR's assets.
As to the first question, the parties have both submitted evidence in support of their
opposing positions as to whether Defendants' decisions to purchase and maintain these particular
LOR assets were made in good fai th to be in the best interests of the corporation after exercising
the care of an ordinarily prudent person in a like position. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(a); FDICv.
Loudermilk, 295 Ga. 579,581,580-81

(2014).

The factfinder can determine whether Gary and

Randall made these asset decisions in bad faith for the purpose of benefitting themselves or for
legitimate business purposes.
However, the Court agrees the injury suffered by LOR and all its other shareholders for
purchasing and maintaining these assets is no different than the injury suffered by the Marital
Trust. This claim is unlike the claims alleging the Marital Trust suffered a special injury. Thus,
the breach of fiduciary claim as it relates to the purchase and maintenance of the ranches, the bus
and the planes cannot be maintained as a direct action. See Grace Bros. v. Farley Indus., Inc.,
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264 Ga. 817, 820 (1994) (finding one claim could be maintained as direct action but other claims
were "founded upon injuries which are no different from that suffered by the corporation or the
other shareholders" and therefore "cannot be sustained because they are, in the final analysis,
derivative claims."),
As to the second question, whether Gary and Randall's exclusive and personal use of
these LOR assets was a breach of their fiduciary duties to the Marital Trust, Plaintiffs argue the
entire fairness standard applies, not the business judgment rule, because benefits from LOR to
Gary and Randall, as directors and controlling shareholders in LOR, would be self-dealing
transactions. This Court agrees. Both sides present evidence demonstrating a dispute of material
fact as to whether the personal use and any reimbursements made for personal use were fair.
Thus, this is a disputed issue for the factfinder to resolve. Furthermore, since personal use of the
assets was only available to some shareholders and not to others, the Court finds a direct action
in this circumstance is available.
As part of this claim of self-dealing, Plaintiffs claim Gary and Randall caused LOR to
enter ninety-nine year leases for property at the ranches for their personal use at terms that were
unduly favorable to Gary and Randall. These leases were executed in January, 1993, before the
Marital Trust was formed and became a shareholder of LOR. However, Plaintiffs respond the
leases were secretly entered into and Defendants continued them despite knowing that they
harmed other shareholders. However, the leases could not have been a secret from the Marital
Trust which had not been created at the time the leases were executed. Plaintiffs claim the
Marital Trust has standing based on continuous payments below market on the leases and
inadequate rent, not the initial execution of the Lease. The Court finds any breach offiduciary
duty occurred at the execution of the lease, not upon the subsequent rent payments required
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under the terms of the lease. Since any harm to shareholders would have occurred in 1993, any

claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the leases would be barred by the statute of
limitations.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the Marital Trust
by making twelve below-market loans from LOR to Gary and Randall and to other entities
controlled by Gary and Randall from 2005 to 2012, that resulted in losses for LOR and its
shareholders.
For all loans occurring before July 25,2010, this claim is barred by the four year statute of
limitations. For the remaining four loans made after this date (a 2012 loan to RALTF, LP and
three loans made to RIF on July 19, 2010, August 26, 2010, and May 19, 2011) there remains a
question of fact whether the terms of the loan were fair. The Court has also considered
Defendants' position that this claim must be brought as a derivative claim. However, the Court
finds a direct action is justified in these circumstances for the reasons set out in the Court's prior
Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty claim on the same basis.
V. COUNT III - CONVERSION/ Money Had and Received Against Gary Rollins
Plaintiffs' claim for conversion alleges Gary Rollins wrongfully took money from the
Marital Trust bank accounts on January 17, 1995 and on March 31, 1995. The statute of
limitations for a conversion claim is four years. Walden v. Jones, 252 Ga. App. 692, 694 (2001).
Because this claim accrued on or before July 25,2010, it is barred by the statute oflimitations
for the reasons discussed above. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count TIr for
conversion is GRANTED.
Assuming the statute of limitations was tolled, Defendants argue this claim should be
dismissed because LOR was authorized to administer the Trust and LOR directed the money to
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pay Gary and Ruth's joint tax liabilities.

However, Plaintiffs dispute they approved LOR to

administer the Marital Trust contrary to the Marital Trust instrument. Under the instrument,
Gary as grantor maintained the tax liabilities, but had no rights over the Trust property. Thus, in
the absence of a statute of limitations defense, Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence for
presentation to the finder of fact.
VI. COUNT IV - PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS DECLARED
LOR

AND OWED AGAINST

Plaintiffs' claim for payment of dividends alleges LOR declared and owed dividends to
the Marital Trust that were not paid. All of these dividends were declared between 2001 and
2008. Plaintiffs concede this claim would be barred in the absence of a tolling of the statute of
limitations and, as discussed above, there is no evidence of fraud sufficient to toll the statuteof
limitations. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count IV for payment of
dividends owed is GRANTED.
[n

the absence of a statute of limitation defense, the Court finds there would be a

sufficient issue of material fact for the tinder of fact on this Count.
VII. Count V - Unjust Enrichment Against Gary Rollins

Plaintiffs claim Gary was unjustly enriched when he took money from the Marital Trust
bank accounts and when LOR diverted dividends intended for the Marital Trust to Gary's
personal accounts. The statute of limitations for an unjust enrichment claim is four years and
begins to run on the date the claim could be brought. Renee Unlimited, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,
301 Ga. App. 254, 258(2) (2009). As discussed above, these allegations are time-barred.
To the extent Plaintiffs are alleging Gary was unjustly enriched through his self-dealing
and his personal use of LOR assets, these claims would not be barred to the extent they occurred
after July 25,2010.
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Thus, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count V for unjust enrichment is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

VIII. Count VI - Dissolution of LOR
Defendants argue Plaintiffs' claim for dissolution fails because they are unable to present
evidence of corporate waste and there are adequate remedies at law precluding equitable relief.
See Gregory v. JT Gregory & Son, inc., 176 Ga. App. 788, 791 (1985); Smith v. Albright-

England, Co., 171 Ga. 544,545 (1930). Plaintiffs argue there is sufficient evidence of corporate
waste and the general principal against equitable relief if there are adequate remedies oflaw does
not apply in the face of a statutory right for dissolution under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1430(2)(D).

This

statute allows for judicial dissolution in proceeding by shareholder if "corporate assets are being
misapplied or wasted." Id. Since the claim for corporate waste survives the Motion for
Summary Judgment, so would the claim for dissolution.
Defendants argue the claim for dissolution must be brought as a derivative claim.
Plaintiffs rely on O.C.G.A. §14-2-1430

which expressly allows a claim for dissolution to be

brought "by a shareholder" against a corporation. This Court agrees the claim for dissolution can
be maintained as a direct action.
Finally, Defendants raise the defense oflaches.

"[Cjourts of equity may interpose an

equitable bar whenever, from the lapse oftirne and laches of the complainant, it would be
inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights." O.C.G.A.

§ 9-3-3. This defense requires

proof of (1) unreasonable delay and (2) prejudice to Defendants.

Stone v. Williams, 265 Ga. 480

(1995). "[L] aches is a factual defense." Troup v. Loden, 266 Ga. 650, 650 (1996). Relying on
the same arguments raised for tolling the statute of limitations, Plaintiffs claim they did not
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discover their role as trustees of the Marital Trust or Gary and Randall's wrongdoing until
recently. Further, they claim Defendants were not prejudiced by the delay in bringing the suit.
Plaintiff's claim for dissolution is based on alleged corporate waste and the alleged corporate
waste, as discussed above, has occurred within the statute oflimitations. Therefore, Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment on the Count VI for dissolution is DENIED.

IX. Equitable Remedies and Damages Sought
A. Constructive Trust
Plaintiffs seek a constructive trust against Gary and Randall as an alternative to damages
for breach of fiduciary duty exceeding $100 million and as an alternative to the approximately
$14 million of restitution sought in Count V for unjust enrichment.

"A constructive trust is a

trust implied whenever the circumstances are such that the person holding legal title to property,
either from fraud or otherwise, cannot enjoy the beneficial interest in the property without
violating some established principle of equity." O.C.G.A. § 53-12-132(a)

(eff. July 1, 2010). To

the extent the claims survive the Motion, Defendants argue there are adequate remedies at law
precluding equitable relief. The Court will reserve a ruling until after any appeal is finally
resolved.
Defendants also argue the remedy is inappropriate since the RFPS Partnerships that hold
the Rollins Public Company stock are not a party. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-132(a); Kelly, 258 Ga. 660
(1988).

However, the claims related to the RFPS Transactions are time-barred so this argument

is moot.
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B. Attorneys' Fees
A claim for attorneys' fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6- II is not an independent cause of
action. As there are other claims surviving summary judgment, Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment as to attorneys' fees is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 28th day of April, 2017.

~e;:·K.~~
Superior Court of Fulton County
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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